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Abstract Contemporary empirical studies on the resource intensity of the economic
process provide evidence of a gradual de-linking between natural resources use and eco-
nomic growth. Resource intensity is evaluated through the Domestic Material Consump-
tion/Gross Domestic Product (DMC/GDP) ratio, defined as the material intensity index.
Trajectories of this ratio support the optimistic view that economic output is becoming
progressively less dependent on resource flows, hence GDP is gradually dematerialized.
The present study asserts that the DMC/GDP indicator fails to take into account the
biophysical properties of the production process which define the resource requirements of
the economy. The present study proposes the ‘‘resources required for producing one unit of
GDP per Capita (Income)’’, as an alternative indicator for evaluating the resource
requirements of the economy. The resource requirement, evaluated at the level of income,
approximates the human scale of production; goods should embody certain biophysical
properties in order to satisfy human needs. The trajectories of DMC/Income index for
global growth rejects the vision of a dematerialized growth and the de-linkage of the
economy from natural resources.
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1 Introduction
Contemporary literature salient to the linkage between economic growth and resource use
asserts empirical evidence for a transition to an era of relatively dematerialized production
(Goodall 2011; Herman et al. 1990; Hawken et al. 1999; Wo¨lfl 2005). Material intensity
(MI) defined as the amount of resources required for producing one unit of GDP, has
demonstrated a decreasing trend since the 1950s for the global economy, marking a strong
decoupling period (Dittrich et al. 2012). Technological progress allowed the efficient use
of material resources; the production process was reengineered; goods and services were
redesigned; and substitutions with lighter materials resulted in the production of lighter
goods. Expectations of technological advances, coupled with a shift in developed countries
towards the service sector, raise optimism as to a further dematerialization of the economic
process and, hence, sustainability prospects.
Recent empirical estimates could be seen as the empirical aftermath of the old, but still
essential, inquiry into the necessity of natural resources in economic production and the
‘‘limits to growth’’ imposed by natural resource scarcity (Tepperman 1981; Mackellar and
Vining 1989). To recall two prominent approaches, Solow’s early work with the aggregate
Cobb–Douglas production functions (Solow, 1956, 1957) supports the assertion that
materials are unimportant, since material flows could be substituted almost perfectly by
manmade capital. ‘‘The world can, in effect, get along without natural resources’’ (Solow
1974, p.11). This approach is further corroborated by later studies (Baumol 1986; Solow
1978). On the other hand, Georgescu-Roegen (1971, 1975, 1976), based on ‘‘flow-fund’’
production functions, verifies constraints on growth implied by the entropic scarcity of
natural resources (Daly 1997).
Recent empirical studies assess the MI of economies by means of the methodological
principles of the economy-wide material flow analysis1 (MFA). The principal indicator for
the evaluation of material intensity is the Domestic Material Consumption/Gross Domestic
Product (DMC/GDP)2 ratio, estimating the material inputs required for the production of
one unit of GDP. (Krausmann et al. 2009, 2011; UNEP 2011). The relevant findings
indicate that material intensity declines almost constantly at the global level and raise
optimism over the potentials for a dematerialized economy with sustainability prospects
(Schandl and Turner 2009; Schandl et al. 2015).
The present study questions these findings and attempts to re-evaluate the material
intensity of global economic growth over the last 100 years. Our estimates, substantially
1 Or Material Flow Accounting. MFA quantifies and monitors the physical properties and dimensions of
economies and provides information about the amounts of natural resources entering the socio-economic
system. The use of natural resources is measured and reported with standardized accounting methods which
permit the development of long run time-series data.
2 Where DMC = Domestic Extraction (DE) ? Material Imports (MI) - Material Exports (ME).
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different from the prevailing ones, result in serious implications for the prospects of
sustainable development and for the contemporary debate over a-growth and de-growth.
(Howarth 2007; Kallis 2011; van den Bergh 2011; van den Bergh and Kallis 2012).
We propose the ratio resource inputs required to produce one unit of ‘‘GDP per
Capita’’, DMC/[GDP per Capita], as an improved approximation of the link between
resource consumption and the economy. ‘‘GDP per Capita’’ stands as the broadly used
monetary-based index of the utility enjoyed by one individual. The utility of one individual
is usually denoted as ‘‘income’’, the key economic variable for evaluating the performance
of the socio-economic system. The analysis remains within the monetary realm which
permits the use of long-run datasets and direct comparison with the standard DMC/GDP
index.
‘‘GDP per Capita’’, as a basis for the evaluation of the MI, brings into the analysis the
reason, the ‘‘cause’’, of the economic process. The economic process aims at the satis-
faction of human beings and therefore the outcome of the economic process ought to be
envisaged on the human scale. Once the economic process is envisaged on the human
scale, the physical properties of goods can be better approximated. Goods should irrevo-
cably possess certain physical properties in order to satisfy human needs, and these
properties set certain limits on the resource requirements. In this context, DMC/[GDP per
Capita] evaluates the MI at the boarders of the economic system by comparing resource
inputs with actual outcome, the utility arising from the consumption of goods. As the utility
is an individualistic perception, ‘‘GDP per Capita’’ emerges as the appropriate monetary
indicator for defining the outcomes of the economy. Aggregate GDP reveals the scale of
the economy; however, the actual outcome cannot be approximated without taking into
account the number of human beings processing GDP.
DMC/[GDP per Capita] defines the resources required for the creation of one unit of
utility defined as the income available to the ‘‘average’’ citizen for the consumption of
goods and services; DMC/[GDP per Capita] could be defined as DMC/Income (where,
GDP per Capita = Income). The difference with the standard DMC/GDP index is essential
and extends beyond their algebraic structures, as it concerns the very essence of the
economic variables considered.
The evaluation of the MI at the income level sets the decoupling debate within the
complexity of the Coupled Human and Natural Systems (CHANS). (Liu et al. 2007;
Mavrommati et al. 2014, 2016) The economy, as a Human Scale Production (HSP) pro-
cess, takes place within the dynamic interaction of Coupled Human and Naturals Systems
(CHANS). The income level, contrary to the aggregate GDP, constitutes a monetary
variable defined on the human scale with clear reference to the human system. Such an
approach creates a better understanding of the dynamic relations between social and
economic activities and the environment. As a result, the proposed indicator may con-
tribute to the sustainability analysis by offering an operational index which better
approximates the dependency of economic growth on natural resources.
The present study focuses on a subcategory of resources, namely, the mass resources.
Contemporary studies mainly examine the linkage between growth and total resource
usage, defined as the material flows of fossil fuels (oil, coal, natural gas); biomass; ores-
industrial minerals; and construction minerals. In addition, a number of studies focus on
the link between growth and energy resources. A disaggregate consideration of mass
resources has not sparked the interest of the analysis, although they do play a distinct role
in the production process. Mass inputs create the scaffold—the ‘‘body’’—of goods, while
energy inputs provide the power for processing mass inputs. The present study limits its
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scope to the link between pure mass resources and economic growth. We compare world3
DMCmass/GDP and world DMCmass/Income estimates. To define mass resources, we
subtract energy (fuel) resources from aggregate resource use (See data section, for more
details). It goes without saying that we do not suggest DMCmass as an alternative to total
DMC; we simply focus on a subcategory of total DMC, specifically that of mass resources.
Our estimates are based on the Material Flow Analysis (MFA) framework which permits
the use of reliable, recently developed datasets and comparability with other relevant
studies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the mass (non-fuel
materials) intensity is estimated at the global aggregate level.
The present paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 reviews the relevant literature on the
decoupling effect and the material intensity dialogue; Sect. 3 presents the proposed
framework for the (re-)estimation of decoupling; Sect. 4 briefly presents the databases
employed for the purposes of our estimates; Sect. 5 presents the analysis and the results of
the estimated decoupling effect at both the global aggregate and disaggregated level, as
well as the estimation of the so-called Decoupling Index (DI); and, finally, Sects. 6 and 7
contain further discussion of the results and the overall concluding remarks, respectively.
2 Decoupling and Material Intensity: A Brief Literature Review
The early attempts to estimate material intensity (Malenbaum 1978; Tilton 1977), as well
as the latest empirical analysis (Krausmann et al. 2009; UNEP 2011; Schandl and West
2012) assert that global aggregate material use has increased at a slower pace than the
global economy—GDP growth—during the last century (Fischer-Kowalski 2011). This
denotes the so-called decoupling of economic growth from material resource inputs, the
‘‘dematerialization’’ of the economic process (Wernick et al. 1996). Relative decoupling
seems to be fairly common in the relevant literature (UNEP 2011), while there are also a
few studies providing empirical evidence for absolute4 material decoupling (De Bruyn
2002; Goodall 2011; Krausmann et al. 2011).
The decoupling literature mainly distinguishes three factors which explain the declining
trends in material intensity: technological progress; substitutions among materials; and
structural changes in GDP towards services (De Bruyn 2002). Concerning technological
progress and material substitution, Bernardini and Galli (1993) attempted to establish a
theoretical framework suggesting that research in material technology and substitutions
among different material types could bring about substantial gains in the dematerialization
of the economic process. The structural change hypothesis asserts that during the early
phases of industrialization, economic growth (GDP) results in an increasing use of material
resources; when the country enters the post-industrial phase, material resource use starts to
decline (Kander 2005), as a result of reorganization of the economy toward services
(Panayotou 1997; Hawken et al. 1999; Panayotou et al. 2000; Stern 2004). The combined
forces of technological progress, material substitution, and structural changes in the
3 While DMC is a notion mainly used for national economies, we use the ‘‘world DMCmass’’ to define the
global aggregate non-fuel materials consumption, in accordance with the relevant literature which uses the
‘‘DMC’’ notion at the global level, as well (i.e. Krausmann et al. 2009).
4 The literature distinguishes the decoupling effect into two distinct categories: relative decoupling and
absolute decoupling. Relative decoupling means that the growth rate of the resource used is lower than the
rate of economic growth (GDP), while absolute decoupling is defined as the decline in resource use
irrespective of the economic growth rate (UNEP 2011, p. 5).
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economy, induce a transition to a post-industrial dematerialization era of economic pro-
duction (Behrens et al. 2007; Brooks and Andrews 1974; Hawken et al. 1999). Many
studies acknowledge dematerialization as an important factor in moving towards the
achievement of long-term sustainability (Ausubel and Waggoner 2008; Hekkert 2000;
Giljum et al. 2005; von Weizsaecker et al. 1998; Hatfield-Dodds et al. 2015).
On the other hand, a large part of the relevant literature questions the potential for further
dematerialization. Taking into account the rapidly developing countries, many suggest that
growth inChina and India has triggeredmaterial intensity further, despite the achievements of
technological progress. Such a trend may finally push the global system to the unsustainable
boundaries of resource availability (Schandl and Eisenmenger 2006). Further ‘‘pessimism’’
over the future potential of decoupling arises from the consumption trends of the western
lifestyle, a lifestyle being adopted by more and more developing countries which entails
substantial material requirements (Reisch and Røpke 2004; Røpke 2001; Wernick 1996).
Furthermore, some studies (Trainer 1999; Vogely 1976;Wernick et al. 1996) support the idea
that, if a trend away from manufacturing is truly occurring, it would not necessarily lead to
less material use, since the service sector generates its own material requirements. In that
context, many (Auty 1985; Cleveland and Ruth 1999; Herman et al. 1990; Røpke 2001)
question a service economy’s potential for bringing about dematerialization, while others
claim that the slowdown in material intensity may be a fallacy in terms of real production
(Herring 2006; Jackson 2009; Kander 2005; Lawn 2001; Trainer 2001). More radically,
Ayres andWarr (2004) conclude that evidence points to the fact that dematerialization cannot
be achieved except by putting an end to economic growth, a view that is further supported by
some recent studies (Heinberg 2011; Jackson 2009; Martenson 2011; Daly 2013).
3 The Human Scale of Production and Implications for Material Intensity
The efficiency of a system should be estimated at its borders by comparing actual inputs
with actual outputs. The ratio by which inputs are transformed into outputs indicates the
way in which the system performs to produce actual outcomes. According to this rationale,
the link between the economy and resources should be evaluated by estimating the material
requirements of the final, the ultimate, outcome of the economy. An economy produces
exchangeable goods whose consumption satisfies human needs. The economic welfare/
utility, arising from the satisfaction of human needs stands as the ultimate objective of the
economy. Within the monetary framework, welfare/utility is measured through one of the
most commonly utilized economic indexes, that of ‘‘GDP per Capita’’. Contemporary
research has proposed various alternative monetary measurements of economic welfare,
such as the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (Daly and Cobb 1989), the Human
Development Index (Stapleton and Garrod 2007), the Index of Economic Well-Being
(Thiry 2015), and the Genuine Progress Indicator (Costanza et al. 2014). In addition, many
countries have developed ‘‘Quality of Life’’ (QOL) qualitative indexes and statistics that
attempt to measure quality of life, as an alternative to monetary indicators (Hagerty et al.
2001). All these contemporary approaches still have many differences in their theoretical
foundations. Furthermore, the availability of data sets is extremely limited and the potential
for empirical analysis seriously constrained (ibid). Under these restrictions, the use of GDP
per Capita still remains the predominant measurement of economic welfare in the vast
majority of international reports and statistics (EU and OECD 2012), despite its well-
recognized shortcomings (Dowrick 2007; Costanza et al. 2014). The existence of long-run
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datasets with relatively reliable data on ‘‘GDP per Capita’’ has further promoted its use as
the appropriate indicator for the macro approximation of the very essence of economies.
(Maddison 2003, 2008; EU and OECD 2012; OECD 2013) The classification of countries
into developed and developing ones is an eloquent example of the use of GDP per Capita
as predominant macroeconomic indicator for approximating the actual outcome of the
economies.
An economy is evaluated, ceteris paribus, on the basis of the income enjoyed by the
average individual. Within this context, the estimation of the MI for the creation of one
unit of income is a satisfactory approximation for the actual resource efficiency of the
economic process, which is an engine that transforms material inputs, combined with other
production factors, into the utility enjoyed by human beings, reflected in monetary terms,
by the income available to individuals. On the other hand, GDP reflects the scale of the
economy; an aggregation defined regardless of the number of individuals served. The
actual outcome of the economy can only be estimated as the utility provided to the citizens.
Therefore, the number of citizens should be taken directly into account, as economies of
the same GDP level may provide substantially different levels of welfare, once different
population levels are served by these economies. Let us assume two economies of the same
scale reflected by the very same aggregate GDP (Table 1).
The two economies differ in their population sizes as economy B aims at satisfying the
needs of a population twice as large as that of economy A. As a result, the GDP per Capita of
Economy A is double that of Economy B, indicating, ceteris paribus, that its citizens enjoy
twice as much economic welfare/utility, also twice the purchasing power, and thus twice the
income. TheMI, defined asDMC/GDP, is exactly the same for both economies, indicating that
one unit of GDP requires the very same resource inputs. However, thisMI estimate cannot take
into account the essential output of the two economic systems which are fundamentally
different as they provide different levels of welfare to their citizens. The DMC/Income index
evaluates the material requirements of the actual outcome of the two economic systems, the
utility, as it is approximated by the income available to the citizens. And the material
requirements of the ultimate outcome of economy B emerge as twice those of economy A.
Indeed, economy A is much more effective in the use of resources since the same aggregate
amount of resources provides two times the level of income for its citizens than economy B.
The present study argues that the prevailing decoupling estimates, made at the level of
the aggregate GDP, conceal important aspects of the link between the economy and
resources. The main reason is that aggregate GDP is not sensitive, even indirectly, to the
physical aspects of production (Bithas and Kalimeris 2013, 2016). The MI is irrevocably
the composite effect of the physical properties of the goods produced. As GDP stands at the
highest level of monetary abstraction, it is not sensitive to the physical properties of goods
which determine the actual material requirements of the economy. Indeed, GDP reflects the
aggregate of the monetary value of all goods produced through the economic process and
hence, GDP stands as a monetary amalgam that homogenizes all production in monetary
terms. The overwhelming effects of the current growth trends of the ‘‘dematerialized’’
sectors of the economy—such as financial services, social media and other knowledge-
based activities—render a picture of a drastically dematerialized GDP. However, before
consuming the less materially-intensive goods, human beings need to satisfy their basic
needs (such as, thirst, hunger, shelter, transportation, etc.) which require goods with
substantial material requirements. The allocation of aggregate production between basic
and ‘‘dematerialized’’ (services) goods depends on the population level, a variable that
determines the GDP per Capita (income) index, while aggregate GDP remains insensitive
to population level.
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The MI reflects the physical aspects of the economy, the goods produced, and therefore,
it should be evaluated at a monetary level at which its physical properties are traceable. By
downscaling aggregate GDP to the level of ‘‘income’’, we evaluate the material require-
ment for the average basket of goods consumed by the citizens. ‘‘GDP per Capita’’ refers,
ceteris paribus, to a set of goods whose physical properties can be traced, even indirectly.
The set of goods, reflected by the GDP per Capita index, approximates the average pro-
duction of an economy and hence the allocation between ‘‘basic’’ goods and less materi-
ally-intensive (service-like) sectors. The basket of goods reflected by ‘‘GDP per Capita’’
approximates the synthesis of the different sectors of an economy much more satisfactorily
than aggregate GDP. This is evident in the example of the two economies (see Table 1)
with the same aggregate GDP but with substantially different populations, and hence GDP
per Capita. The economy with the higher GDP per Capita, ceteris paribus, is more
intensively oriented towards service-like goods; an orientation which cannot be reflected
by the very same aggregate GDP of the two economies. The basket of goods whose
monetary value is indicated by the GDP per Capita approximates the set, and especially the
synthesis, of basic and service-like goods consumed by citizens. These goods should have
certain properties in order to satisfy the needs of human beings. Hunger, thirst, transport,
housing, etc., on one hand, and telecommunications, social media, and other services on
the other hand, are all satisfied by a ‘‘basket’’ of goods whose monetary value is
approximated by the ‘‘GDP per Capita’’ index. The physical properties of goods are
indirectly traceable at the level of GDP per Capita, since the allocation of the aggregate
production to different sectors is better approximated.
The actual contribution of the present analysis is the consideration of the economic
process on the Human Scale, a consideration with implications for the evaluation of the
Material Intensity of the economy. As human needs are the ultimate ‘‘cause’’, and human
beings the ultimate ‘‘causa-efficiente’’, of the economic process, the outcome of the pro-
duction process should therefore be envisioned on the Human Scale. The concept of ‘‘hu-
man scale’’ is widely used in social and environmental sciences (Gibson et al. 2007; Folke
et al. 1996), and certain economic approaches use the ‘‘human scale’’ to analyze economic
development (Cruz et al. 2009; Max-Neef 1991, 1992). However, although the human scale
is relevant, it is largely neglected by studies of dematerialization and decoupling. The
present research aims at evaluating the implications of the human scale on the material
requirements of the production process. We thus define the proposed framework, as Human
Scale Production (HSP), production that is directly related to the restrictions and limitations
imposed by the bio-physical properties of the human scale on decoupling potentials (Bithas
and Kalimeris 2016). By evaluating the MI of ‘‘GDP per Capita’’ the human scale enters the
decoupling analysis. The present study proposes DMC/Income (where Income = GDP per
Capita), as an alternative framework for evaluating the link between economic growth and
natural resource use. The proposed indicator evaluates the resource requirement of an
economic variable, GDP per Capita, that approximates the physiology of actual goods more
successfully than GDP. DMC/Income can be seen as an evaluation of the Material Intensity
Table 1 Comparing two indicative hypothetical economies
Economies DMC
(tons)
Population
(pers.)
GDP ($) Income
(welfare in $)
DMC/GDP
(kg/$)
DMC/Income
(kg/welfare$)
Economy A 1000 2500 $10,000 $4 0.10 250
Economy B 1000 5000 $10,000 $2 0.10 500
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that takes into account the effects and the constraints imposed by the human scale of
production serving actual human needs (HSP). DMC/Income investigates the link between
resources and production, once the production process is envisaged as taking place at the
human scale, with the economy being an integral part of the actuality of Coupled Human
and Natural Systems (CHANS). (Liu et al. 2007; Mavrommati et al. 2016).
The interest of this article lies in the comparison between the historical trends of the
standard ‘‘DMC/GDP’’ and the proposed ‘‘DMC/Income’’ ratios. Since these indicators
have different algebraic structures, their numerical values are by definition different and
their comparison meaningless. However, the historical trajectory of the ‘‘materials required
for the production of one unit of Income’’ reveals important aspects which are masked in
the trajectory of the ‘‘materials required for the production of one unit of GDP’’. This
comparison is the real essence of the present analysis and concerns the very essence of the
economic variables incorporated in the two indicators which extend beyond their algebraic
forms. DMC/GDP evaluates the MI of the average monetary unit, while DMC/Income the
MI of one unit of income which approximates the utility provided by the set of goods
consumed by the average individual. Indeed, this difference is essential.
The present study limits its scope to pure mass resources. The link between aggregate
resources (mass and energy) and growth, as well as the link between energy and the economy
have been sufficiently investigated in recent studies. However, the role of puremass resources
in the economic process has not hitherto attracted the interest of analysts, although mass
resources play a distinct role since it provides the inputs necessary for the shaping the body,
the material structure, the physical dimension of goods. The present study emphasizes the
physical dimensions of goods, the physical properties with substantial implications for the
requirements of mass resources. A house cannot be useful if it has the dimensions of a
dollhouse; a car cannot be functional if it has the size of a toy car. Themain assumption of the
present study is that the satisfaction of human needs requires ‘‘real world’’ goods which,
inevitably, have certain physical dimensions. The shaping of these physical dimensions
requires substantialmass flows. The ‘‘cause’’ behind the physical dimensionality of economic
production is the nature of human needs. The outcome of the economic process has certain
physical dimensions determined by the ‘‘human scale’’ (Lawn 2001). Goods are embodied in
certain physical forms, a ‘‘scaffold’’ that is constructed from mass inputs. Evidently,
DMCmass is not proposed as an alternative measure over DMC, but as a subcategory of DMC.
4 Data Overview
In order to confer a sense of comparability, the present study draws data5 from Krausmann
et al. (2009), one of the most up-to-date studies on global material intensity estimates. It
also uses unpublished data kindly provided by the corresponding author of the afore-
mentioned study, Prof. Dr. Fridolin Krausmann, following personal communication, in
2012.6 The present study focuses exclusively on mass (non-fuel) inputs, for the period
1900–2009. As mass inputs (defined as World DMCmass) we aggregate: non-fuel biomass;
5 Data are available at: http://www.uni-klu.ac.at/socec/inhalt/1088.htm.
6 We received disaggregated data on wood-fuel, as being the only available ‘‘fuel’’ part of biomass. In this
context, we assume that data on wood fuel biomass is the only fuel part of aggregate biomass. However, our
estimates may fail to trace the use of timber extraction and other agricultural by-products as fuel materials;
consequently, there is a possibility of having underestimated the real fuel biomass quantity. For more details
concerning the way that aggregate biomass has been estimated, see Krausmann et al. (2009).
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ores-industrial minerals; and construction minerals. In this context, the equation between
the time series of the World DMC, estimated by Krausmann et al. (2009), and the time
series of the World DMCmass, estimated by the present study, can be summarized as:
World DMCmass½  ti ¼ World DMC½  ti
 all energy carrier materials oil; coal; and natural gasð Þ½  ti
 wood-fuel biomass½  ti
ð1Þ
with i taking values between the time (t) period 1900–2009.
In order to capture only the non-fuel biomass in our estimates, we have excluded fuel
biomass, wood-fuel in particular, from the total aggregate biomass time series. DMCmass is
expressed in 1000 metric tons per year (1000 t/yr).
Data on GDP and population are drawn from Maddison (2003, 2008).7 The GDP is
measured in millions of 1990 International Geary-Khamis US$8 per year. Population is
expressed in millions of persons per year.
5 Analysis and Results
5.1 The Global Aggregate MImass
Figure 1 depicts the decoupling estimates of the World ‘‘DMCmass/GDP’’ ratio and the
World ‘‘DMCmass/Income’’ ratio, both indexed to a base year (1900 = 1), for the period
1900–2009. The World DMCmass/GDP ratio follows a steep decoupling trend throughout
the period examined. A few brief interruptions occur from 1921 to 1930 (post-WWII
period and economic recession of 1929); from 1932 to 1942 (pre-WWII period and out-
break of WWII); and from 1945 to 1950 (post-WWII period). An uninterrupted declining
trend is observed during the 1950–2000 period. Finally, the period 2000–2009 is charac-
terized by stabilization of the World DMCmass/GDP.
In contrast, the World DMCmass/Income ratio, reflecting the proposed evaluation
framework, depicts a macro-coupling relation for most of the period examined (Fig. 1).
Specifically, a period of relative stability occurs from 1900 to 1921, followed by some
minor fluctuations from 1922 to 1950. From 1951 onwards, material intensity increases
steadily until 2009, with only some brief interruptions occurring during the 1990–1992
period. Notably, the recent 2000–2009 period is characterized by an accelerating coupling
trend.
5.2 Disaggregating Mass Resources: Ores-Industrial Minerals; Construction
Minerals; Non-fuel Biomass
In this section we disaggregate World DMCmass into three major and distinct mass forms:
ores-industrial minerals; construction minerals; and non-fuel biomass (Krausmann et al.
2009). Material intensity is estimated separately for each category.
7 Data available at: http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm.
8 The International Geary-Khamis dollar is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing
power as that of the 1990 United States dollar in the USA.
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5.2.1 Trends of the Relative use of Individual Mass Inputs
Before estimating decoupling ratios for individual mass forms, Fig. 2 demonstrates the
trends in their relative use as a proportion (%) of the world’s total mass resources
(DMCmass). At the beginning of the period under examination (1900), global aggregate
mass supply stood at 5.6 billion tons per year, out of which 84.5 % was the share of non-
fuel biomass. Ores-industrial minerals and construction minerals accounted for 3.7 and
11.8 %, respectively. Non-fuel biomass followed a steady decline until 1913. This trend is
reversed during WWI, where non-fuel biomass increased from 79.8 % in 1913 to 82.7 %
in 1919, while ores-industrial and construction minerals showed a smooth decline (from
5.8 and 14.4 % in 1913 to 4.5 and 12.8 % in 1919, respectively).
After WWI, non-fuel biomass declined again until the recession of 1929–1933. In the
meantime, the contributions of ores-industrial and construction minerals continued
increasing until 1929. The great depression (1929–1933) marked once again an increase in
non-fuel biomass use (from 75.8 % in 1929 to 79.8 % in 1933), while the use of ores-
industrial and construction minerals declined in the same period (from 7.1 and 17.1 % in
1929 to 4.1 and 16.1 % in 1933, respectively). From 1933 on, non-fuel biomass use
(79.9 %) declined continuously until 1940 (73.9 %). It was accompanied by a corre-
sponding increase in the use of ores-industrial minerals (from 4 % in 1933 to 7.8 % in
1940), and construction minerals (from 16 to 18.3 %, during 1933–1940). The WWII
period (1940–1945) marked the last peak in the relative use of non-fuel biomass (76.4 % in
1945) while the contributions of ores-industrial and construction minerals declined from
7.8 and 18.3 % in 1940 to 6.3 and 17.3 % in 1945, respectively. The year 1945 constituted
-0.5
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Fig. 1 The world DMCmass/GDP and world DMCmass/Income ratios for 1900–2009, all indexed
(1900 = 1). World DMCmass is the aggregation of ores, industrial minerals, construction minerals, and
non-fuel biomass. Data source Krausmann et al. (2009) and personal communication
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a turning point, marking the start of a long period in which the share of non-fuel biomass
followed a sharp and continuous decline, while construction minerals sharply increased
their contribution to total mass flows; Ores-industrial minerals presented a slower increase
compared to construction minerals. These trends continued uninterrupted until 1972, the
early phase of the first oil crisis. During the 1972–1976 period stabilization occurred with
biomass varying around 50.3 %, ores-industrial minerals 12.5 %, and construction min-
erals 36.5 %. After 1976, non-fuel biomass decreased steadily whereas construction
minerals increased sharply. Ores and industrial minerals remained rather stable after 1976.
The year 1997 was the next milestone as construction minerals took the lion’s share
(44.6 %), a situation which continued uninterrupted until 2009, reaching 52.5 % of total
DMCmass, while the non-fuel biomass contribution fell back to 33.5 % (2009). Ores-
industrial minerals displayed a relatively steady contribution to the share of total DMCmass,
fluctuating between 10.5 and 12.5 % for most of the period 1976–2009.
The historical trends in the use of renewable and nonrenewable (mass) resources arise as
an important issue in recent economic history. Renewable non-fuel biomass has been
gradually replaced with non-renewable ores-industrial and construction minerals during
1900–2009. Non-fuel biomass which stood at 76.4 % in 1945 presented declining use until
1973 (50.4 %), while non-renewable resources showed a sharp increase during the same
period (from 23.6 % in 1945 to 49.6 % in 1973). After 1986, non-renewable materials took
the lion’s share in total DMCmass (from 50.1 % in 1986 to 64.6 % in 2009), while the share
of renewable mass resources (non-fuel biomass) declined continuously from 49.2 % in
1986 to 35.4 % in 2009. The relevant trends are presented in Table 2.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
%
 o
f t
he
 to
ta
l a
gg
re
ga
te
  
years
Share of each mass form in total DMCmass use 1900-2009
Ores and Industrial minerals
Construction minerals
Non-fuel Biomass
Fig. 2 Share of mass forms in (%) of world total DMCmass use, estimated for ores and industrial minerals,
construction minerals, and non-fuel biomass for 1900–2009. Data source Krausmann et al. (2009) and
personal communication
The Material Intensity of Growth: Implications from the…
123
5.2.2 MI Estimates of Individual Mass Inputs
Figure 3a–c present the world ‘‘Ores-Industrial Minerals/GDP’’ and the world ‘‘Ores-In-
dustrial Minerals/Income’’; the world ‘‘Construction Minerals/GDP’’ and the world ‘‘Con-
struction Minerals/Income’’; and the world ‘‘non-fuel Biomass/GDP’’ and the world ‘‘non-
fuel Biomass/Income’’, respectively. All estimated indicators are indexed (1900 = 1).
The ‘‘Ores-Industrial Minerals/GDP ratio’’ (Fig. 3a) presents three sharp decoupling
periods: 1913–1921 (WWI and the early post-WWI period); 1929–1933 (The Great
Depression); and 1941–1946 (WWII and the early post-WWII period). From 1946 on, the
ratio gradually follows an increasing trend until 1970, when it peaks at its highest level of
the whole period examined. Eventually, Material Intensity (MI) of ores and industrial
minerals gradually declines for most of 1971–1994. From 1995 to 2009, the ‘‘Ores-In-
dustrial Minerals/GDP ratio’’ seems to stabilize, showing a hint of a marginal increase
between 2001 and 2009. A rather different evolutionary pattern characterizes the ‘‘Ores-
Industrial Minerals/Income’’ (Fig. 3a) which depicts the same dematerialization periods
(WWI; the Great Depression; and WWII), albeit not as sharply as depicted in the ‘‘Ores-
Industrial Minerals/GDP ratio’’ trajectory. However, from 1946 to 1974, the ‘‘Ores-In-
dustrial Minerals/Income’’ ratio shows a sharp increase in material intensity. The fluctu-
ations observed from 1975 to 1994 are again followed by a sharp increase in material
intensity from 1994 to 2009.
The ‘‘Construction Minerals/GDP’’ ratio (Fig. 3b) results in three dematerialization
periods: 1913–1919 (WWI); 1929–1933 (the Great Depression); and 1939–1945 (WWII).
From 1945 to 1960, ‘‘Construction Minerals/GDP’’ increases sharply, settling into a period
of relative stability from 1960 to 1980, followed by a brief period of decline from 1980 to
2000, and sharply increasing again in the 2000–2009 period. The ‘‘Construction Minerals/
Income’’ ratio (Fig. 3b) presents a relative stability with smooth fluctuations from 1900 to
1945. After 1945 and until 2009, the ratio depicts a constant coupling relationship between
construction minerals and Income, marginally interrupted during the 1988–1992 period.
The ‘‘Non-fuel Biomass/GDP’’ ratio indicates a constant biomass intensity decline during
1900–2009 (Fig. 3c). Two periods may be identified: 1900–1980 which results in firm
decoupling; and 1981–2009 when moderate decoupling is observed. On the other hand, the
‘‘Non-fuel Biomass/Income’’ ratio indicates a prolonged period of relative steadiness for the
period 1900–1950. A sharp biomass intensity decline is observed during 1951–1966, fol-
lowed by a period of fluctuating intensity from 1967 to 1980. Again, the period 1980–1992
shows increasing non-fuel biomass intensity, followed by a brief decline during 1993–2006.
Finally, the period 2006–2009 hints at a marginal increase of non-fuel biomass intensity.
Table 2 Changes in the composition of renewable and non-renewable mass resources for selected years
(expressed in % of the world DMCmass)
Year Renewable mass flowsa (%) Non-renewable mass flowsb (%)
1900 84.5 15.5
1945 76.4 23.6
1973 50.4 49.6
1986 49.9 50.1
2009 35.4 64.6
a Non-fuel biomass
b Ores-industrial and construction minerals
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5.3 The Evaluation of Decoupling Index (DI) for World DMCmass/GDP
and World DMCmass/Income
The present section evaluates the Decoupling Index (DI) proposed by UNEP (2011). DI
evaluates the sensitivity of GDP to the changes in natural resource use, defined as the
elasticity of GDP to the natural resource inputs. As proposed by Bithas and Kalimeris
(2013), in order to smooth out short-term fluctuations of the economic cycles we estimate a
time period of one decade instead of the proposed one-year period, by using moving
averages per decade:
First, we estimate the DI for the standard DMCmass/GDP ratio:
DMCmasst  DMCmasst1Þ=DMCmasst1ð
GDPt  GDPt1Þ=GDPt1ð ¼
D DMCmassð Þ
D GDPð Þ ð2Þ
where t is an averaged time period of one decade. Hence, t-1 represents the change from
the average of one decade to the next. Secondly, we estimate the DI for DMCmass/Income,
using the same formula but with GDP replaced by GDP per Capita throughout.
DI is interpreted as follows (UNEP 2011):
• DI[ 1: there is coupling between the two variables examined.
• DI = 1 is the turning point between coupling and relative decoupling.
• 0\DI\ 1: relative decoupling is taking place.
• DI = 0 indicates that the economy is growing while resource consumption remains
constant. This is the turning point between relative and absolute decoupling.
• DI\ 0: the relationship can be described as absolute decoupling.
Figure 4 displays estimates of the DI for the standard world DMCmass/GDP and the
proposed world DMCmass/Income (indexed decade 1900 = 1). As far as the standard
DMCmass/GDP is concerned, DI results in a prolonged relative decoupling throughout the
whole period examined, with values between 0.5 and 0.7, always\1. In contrast, the DI of
the proposed DMCmass/Income indicator, with the exception of a smooth relative decou-
pling period (1910 decade: 1910–1919, where DI = 0.96 & 1), results in a constant
coupling, with values above 1 which represents the borderline between coupling and
relative decoupling. Evidently, the elasticities estimated by DI further support funda-
mentally different trajectories for the two indicators.
6 Discussion
The empirical estimates indicate that the ‘‘mass inputs required for the production of a unit
of GDP’’ follow fundamentally different trends from the ‘‘mass inputs required for the
production of one unit of Income’’. DMCmass/GDP follows a decoupling trend which
strongly supports the dematerialization of the economy. In contrast, the DMCmass/Income
supports a strong linkage between Income and mass inputs, and therefore a dependency of
the economic process on mass resources. This dependency is clearly depicted in the
estimates of individual mass inputs as the findings indicate a stronger link between growth
and those resources with increasing relative share. This conclusion is clearly supported by
both MI indicators. Specifically, the use of construction materials is coupled with growth
for both ratios, though more intensively for ‘‘Construction minerals/Income’’, as con-
struction materials increase their share in total material use. The same holds true for ores
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and industrial minerals. On the contrary, the decoupling trends for non-fuel biomass
intensify as the use of non-fuel biomass shrinks. Specifically, for the period 1950–1966
when the non-fuel biomass contribution declined from 69.4 % in 1950 to 55.1 % in 1966,
both ‘‘Non-fuel Biomass/GDP’’ and ‘‘Non-fuel Biomass/Income’’ ratios (Fig. 3c) indicate a
sharp reduction of biomass intensity. Similarly, the strong decoupling periods (WWI, the
Great Depression, and WWII) of ores-industrial minerals and construction minerals
(Fig. 3a, b, respectively), are accompanied by a decrease of their shares in total material
use.
Evidently, decoupling of each individual mass flow occurs mainly when its share in
total mass resources (DMCmass) shrinks, while the periods of its increasing relative use are
characterized by stronger coupling with growth.
Remarkably, estimates of Material Intensity (MImass) for individual mass inputs are
revealing with regard to the structural changes in the link between the economy and
resources during periods of socioeconomic crisis. Indeed, during periods of uncertainty
(wartime and economic recessions), the socioeconomic process depends more intensively
on those resources which are more easily accessible. Indeed, easily accessible biomass
increases its relative share during crises. Notably, although the relevant impacts are
reflected by both indicators, the DMCmass/Income index more clearly approximates the
particular characteristics of the dependency of the economic process on those resources
more easily accessible during wartime and periods of extreme recessions. These extraor-
dinary events result in changes in the way human needs are satisfied, with implications for
the MI of the economy. These impacts are better approximated by the proposed indicator,
which is sensitive to the structure of the economy.
The empirical analysis also indicates a macro-trend concerning the relative share of
renewable-nonrenewable resources and the respective material intensities. Throughout the
period with available data, nonrenewable resources are constantly increasing their use
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Fig. 4 The estimation of the decoupling index (DI) for the standard world DMCmass/GDP and the proposed
world DMCmass/Income for 1900–2009 (indexed decade 1900 = 1)
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relative to renewable ones (non-fuel biomass). This trend results in a major landmark in the
mid-1980s, when nonrenewable mass inputs became predominant. The sheer reduction in
the share of renewable mass inputs is associated with a clear decoupling confirmed by both
indicators. On the other hand, the constantly increasing relative share of nonrenewable
resources is accompanied by a strong link between their use and the economic process, a
finding supported by both decoupling indicators, notably, far more intensely by the
DMCmass/Income ratio.
7 Conclusions
Does ‘‘matter’’ matter in economic growth? The paper attempts to answer this question by
estimating the historical dependency of production on mass inputs. Towards this objective,
the paper compares empirical estimates following the standard MI evaluation framework
(DMCmass/GDP) with estimates based on the DMCmass/Income index reflecting the
framework proposed by the present study. The differences in the historical trajectories are
interpreted through a bio-economic approximation of the production process. The world
DMCmass/GDP follows a decreasing path throughout the economic history of the period
1900–2009. This prevailing trend, once combined with unparalleled technological
advance, may well raise optimism for a transition to an era of the relative dematerialization
of the economic process and substantial independence from material resources. This rea-
soning is based on considerations of the economy at the level of aggregate GDP, the
highest level of monetary aggregation. Envisaging the economy at the aggregate level
deprives the production process of any correspondence to its physical properties. Goods are
transformed into a monetary amalgam and then, the creation of one monetary unit can be
envisaged to require infinitesimal material inputs.
However, real world goods embody certain bio-physical properties in order to satisfy
human needs. The implications and limitations imposed by the physical properties of real-
world goods in the evaluation of the link between the economy and resources ought to be
taken into account. Human needs are the ‘‘cause’’ of production since human beings are the
‘‘causa-efficiente’’ of the economic process. The actual properties of production can be
traced once the production is envisioned on the human scale. GDP per Capita emerges as
an index that reflects the Human Scale of Production (HSP) within the monetary domain,
as approximates a more tangible set of goods, denoted as the average income consumed by
the representative citizen. The physical properties of production could be traced more
effectively for the set of goods denoted by ‘‘GDP per Capita’’. Within the HSP framework,
we propose the DMC/Income ratio as a better approximation of the actual MI of the
production process. Empirical estimates of the world DMCmass/Income indicate increasing
MImass after 1950 and up to 2009. Contemporary economic growth requires dispropor-
tionate increments in mass inputs. The economic process remains dependent on mass
resources despite unparalleled technological advances.
DMCmass/GDP and DMCmass/Income indicators reflect two fundamentally different
perceptions of the economic process, a difference that overcomes their numerical forms
and concerns the very essence of the economy. If the economic process is perceived as an
engine ultimately producing monetary units, then high expectations exist for dematerial-
ization and for the consequent independence of natural resources. On the contrary, if the
economic process is envisaged as a human scale process producing goods in order to serve
the human needs of an increasing population then, although there might be some potential
for decoupling due to technological progress and reconstruction of the economy, ultimately
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this potential is limited owing to the constraints imposed by the physical properties of real
world goods and the population dynamics (Tepperman 1981). If the economic process is
envisaged as an integral part of Coupled Human-Natural Systems (CHANS), then natural
resources are a crucial and indispensable element for the economic process. This con-
clusion results in serious implications for the sustainability prospects of current growth
rates and sheds new light on the growth-degrowth dialogue.
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